3.5. The Representative Form of Government. Groups of Representatives. The Supremacy of the Elective Principle With Respect to Popular Representatives

Consisting of twelve independent tribes, the people of Israel presented in their external organization a union held together by the theocratic principle, political interest, and ties of blood. Such an organization—given the representative governance that had taken shape historically and existed since ancient times within the individual tribes—presupposed for the general political life of the people as well a form of government in which each tribe, while preserving its independence, would participate in the general governance of the people through its representatives. And this was indeed the case. Matters of common concern were usually decided by representatives of all the tribes, elected from among themselves by the people. The representative system of the Mosaic state developed gradually, in accordance with the demands of historical circumstances, but always on the basis of those ready data for it that were provided both by the organization of the people itself and by its legal customs. It therefore stands in close connection with the internal organization of the people.

Corresponding to the division of the people into twelve tribes, at its head stood twelve representatives of those tribes, elected one from each tribe (excluding the tribe of Levi, which on account of its special calling and position did not participate in the political affairs of the people). These are the so-called “chosen men of the congregation, the chiefs of the tribes of their fathers, the heads of the thousands of Israel” (Num. 1:16). Each of them within his own tribe occupied the position of a prince, and among the people as a whole—the position of representative of his tribe. The assembly of these representatives constituted the first group standing at the head of the governance of the people. They were convened for important political matters of significance for the entire people (Num. 1:2–4).

The second group of representatives of the people consisted of the elected seventy men: “And the Lord said to Moses: ‘Gather for me seventy men of the elders of Israel, whom you know to be the elders of the people and officers over them, and bring them to the tent of meeting, so that they may take their stand there with you. And I will come down and talk with you there. And I will take some of the Spirit that is on you and put it on them, and they shall bear the burden of the people with you, so that you may not bear it yourself alone’” (Num. 11:16–17). These seventy men were elected, as is evident from the text, from among the elders of the Israelite people. It is difficult to determine what served as the criterion for their selection and why exactly seventy were chosen. In accordance with the organic articulation of the people—by which each tribe was divided into clans or generations—one may suppose that these seventy men were none other than the heads of the clans or generations. According to the genealogical table (Num. 26), compiled after a careful census of the people, the number of progenitors—if those counted as progenitors are the sons and grandsons of the tribal progenitors, and in the Josephite tribes the great-grandsons (from Gilead)—amounts to 58. Since the law does not say that the 70 elders were chosen apart from the 12 tribal heads, the representatives of these 58 clans together with the 12 tribal chiefs most probably constituted that assembly of seventy men (58 + 12 = 70) which was called to share with Moses the burden of governing the people. Such a view of the composition of this assembly of seventy elders appears simpler and more natural than, for example, the view of Ewald, according to which the assembly was composed of representatives of the tribes—six from each tribe—a view that requires altering the number of elders by adding two more members. “These representatives of the people constituted,” as Saalschütz says, “a permanent senate which Moses constantly had with him as counselors and assistants.” And such an institution was entirely consistent with Moses’ legislative purposes, since “the consent of the elders and representatives of the people, and the confidence they inspired in the measures undertaken by the lawgiver and in the laws he enacted, could in any case have great moral significance for the people. They also, knowing the people and their needs thoroughly, could serve as the best interpreters of the people’s interests, which the lawgiver was obliged to keep in view in the pursuit of the most exalted state purposes.” This council of seventy is apparently what is referred to in Num. 16:25, where it is said that the “elders of Israel” followed Moses on the occasion of the well-known uprising of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram. Saalschütz supposes that this “council had only moral significance and was not called to replace the full assembly of representatives of the people, in whose hands—as before, so also afterward—the legally recognized authority remained, and whose number was considerably larger.” But such an opinion can scarcely be well-founded: this council could exist and have independent significance without replacing the general popular assembly, but constituting the chief part of it and retaining for itself political significance corresponding to its position—just as the council of 12 tribal representatives, also entering as a part into the council of 70 and into the general assembly, had independent political significance, as is evident from Num. 1, where for the matter of the census of the people only this council was convened.

Finally, the third and most numerous group of the people’s representatives consisted of the so-called “chiefs” or “judges” of the people. This office was established by Moses in the wilderness, on the advice of his father-in-law Jethro, to ease the burden of governing the people. When Jethro saw that Moses was every day compelled from morning until night to occupy himself with adjudicating minor disputes arising among the people, and generally to attend himself to every detail of governing them—so much so that he might thereby neglect the higher interests of the people’s life—he said to him: “What you are doing is not good. You and the people with you will certainly wear yourselves out, for the thing is too heavy for you. You are not able to do it alone. Now obey my voice; I will give you advice, and God be with you. You shall represent the people before God and bring their cases to God, and you shall warn them about the statutes and the laws, and make them know the way in which they must walk and what they must do. Moreover, look for able men from all the people, men who fear God, who are trustworthy and hate a bribe, and place such men over the people as chiefs of thousands, of hundreds, of fifties, and of tens. And let them judge the people at all times. Every great matter they shall bring to you, but any small matter they shall decide themselves. So it will be easier for you, and they will bear the burden with you” (Exod. 18:14–26). Moses heeded the wise counsel of his father-in-law. He proposed the matter to the people, and when they said that it was “a good thing,” he left it to the people themselves to choose from their tribes “wise, understanding, and experienced men” and appointed them as chiefs (Deut. 1:9–15). These “chiefs,” as is evident from the very motive for their appointment, were obligated to adjudicate minor private disputes, with matters being referred according to their greater or lesser importance to the judgment of one or another level of chief—in ascending or descending order. To determine the character and significance of these minor authorities, it is important to determine their relation to the natural gradation of the articulation of the popular organism. The first two groups of representatives of the people correspond fully, as was shown above, to the first two degrees of articulation—tribes and clans. Do these minor chiefs not also correspond to the third degree of the gradation—families? There are no clear indications of this in the legislation—moreover, the mathematical symmetry of the decimal system of this hierarchy evidently makes it immediately impossible to suppose an identity between these newly chosen chiefs and the heads of families, since families naturally never present themselves in such numerical regularity and symmetry. Nevertheless, this system is close precisely to the third degree of articulation of the popular organism—namely, to families. Each family had at its head a representative—the so-called “elder”—who, prior to the establishment of the new system, naturally also governed matters pertaining exclusively to his one family, although this governance did not have an official, legally recognized character. The number of such elders, corresponding to the number of families, was considerable, as can be seen from the fact that 250 of them participated in the conspiracy of Korah (Num. 16:2). Now, when the election of new chiefs was proposed, the people would first of all naturally have turned to the elders for this election, since they were accustomed to see in them those “wise, understanding, and experienced men” whom Moses proposed should be chosen. But if the number of elders proved insufficient to fill all the new positions, the remainder could be elected from among ordinary men possessing the indicated qualities. This is most probably what happened, since “families” in any case constituted a more numerous group than a “ten”—and consequently the heads of families or elders could not have been sufficient to fill all the positions, so that many chiefs of necessity had to be elected from among ordinary men who were not elders. And such a choice did not come into conflict with the natural articulation of the people into three degrees, did not destroy the ancient order of self-governance, but on the contrary imparted to it greater coherence of social structure—introducing into the tribal principles a new “communal” element that gives greater freedom to the individual, liberating it from the exclusive dominance of the tribal principle. Such an order was entirely consistent with the theocratic principle as well, which proclaims the full freedom of the individual.

From what has been presented, one can see what a harmonious and well-ordered system of representation was introduced in the Mosaic state. Thanks to it, the entire people (almost in the literal sense) governed their own state. The normative character of Hebrew representation will stand out even more clearly if we pay attention to the universal dominance of the elective principle. Notwithstanding that the Hebrew people apparently still stood at that stage of development in which the tribal principle predominates in their organization—by virtue of which a person is ordinarily valued not according to his personal merit but according to his standing in the clan, so that even the heads of the various parts of the people were natural (by lineage and seniority) members—the wise lawgiver and founder of the Hebrew state was able to swiftly elevate the people to a new and higher stage of development by granting them full freedom to choose their own leaders, and moreover by surrounding the elective principle with such conditions as, of necessity, as we saw above, compelled the election to overstep the bounds of the tribal principle. The elective principle acquired force not only on the lower levels with respect to higher authorities, but also with respect to the supreme chiefs of the tribes. Although there are no definite indications that the tribal chiefs were appointed by election, this appears to be implied even by their very title—“chosen men of the congregation” (Num. 1:16)—where the epithet “chosen” carries the meaning not merely of superiority in qualities in the sense of nobilissimi (according to the Vulgate), praeclarissimi (according to the Syriac translation), nominalissimi (according to the Arabic translation), but of election in the proper sense of the word, in the sense of ἐπίκλητοι (according to the Greek LXX), nuncupati (according to the Targum of Onkelos), or, as the Hebrew-Samaritan text most clearly expresses it, in the sense of deputati a congregatione. With regard to the election by the people of the council of seventy elders, which forms the second group of leaders, this is also not explicitly stated, though perhaps because popular election was regarded as so ordinary a matter that it was considered unnecessary to mention it. A similar situation presents itself, for example, in the history of the election of minor leaders. In the very narrative concerning the establishment of new officials, nothing is said about their election by the people; on the contrary, the choice or appointment of leaders appears to be attributed exclusively to Moses himself (Exod. 18:25), as is also the case with regard to the council of seventy elders (Num. 11:16), whereas in Deuteronomy 1:13 it is stated plainly that the choice of leaders was left to the people themselves. In any case, even if Moses himself appointed the members of the council independently of popular election, the legitimacy of their representation was already guaranteed by the fact that Moses appointed to the council members from among the “elders and overseers,” who were unquestionably elected by the people themselves. With regard to the third group of representatives of the people, there are, as has already been shown above, direct indications that they were elected by the people themselves. “Choose for yourselves from among your tribes men who are wise, understanding, and experienced, and I will appoint them as your heads” (Deut. 1:13), Moses said to the people. To Moses himself belonged only the right of appointing those elected to their offices—as it were, the right of confirming the election.