3.7. The Character of Representation in the Mosaic State

The organization of the assembly that has been examined provided all conditions for the free political development of the people: in the national assembly, which held supreme governmental and juridical authority, the people itself came forward and, unhindered by any external form, itself looked after its interests and its government. Here, in the full sense, was popular self-governance. “The people of Israel,” says Ewald on this subject, “had from ancient times represented a harmoniously organized community that independently managed and decided its internal and external affairs; and this communal organization was carried out with such consistency that even the smallest parts within the people—each tribe, each clan in the sacred land, and after settlement, each district and each city—was organized in a corresponding manner and independently administered its own affairs. Nothing could become a binding law for the people that had not first been deliberated upon and adopted in the assembly. Not one more or less important resolution or legislative institution could be prescribed for the whole people without the consent of the representatives of the people—the ‘elders’; even a recognized and beloved prophet could not introduce any significant change into the national life without deliberation and the consent of the assembly. This truth is confirmed by closer study of what we know about the Israelite people from its most ancient history to the time of the kings; without it one cannot even fully understand the history of this people. If even the Mosaic legislation, and with it the foundation of all the best national life of that distant time, is in the most ancient view the act of free acceptance on the part of the community and issued from a covenant between them and Jehovah, then even from this most important example one can see how deeply rooted in the people was the idea of free deliberation and adoption of all laws in the community.”

As a complete expression of the independently developed principles of national life, the form of popular self-governance that has been examined lay at the foundation of all the state life of the people and retained its significance throughout the entire history of the people’s existence as a state. By its inner character, this system of self-governance is entirely indifferent to the external form of government—whether it be republican or monarchical. In either case, self-governance, which had struck such deep roots in the inner national life, fully retained its defining significance, so that the external form was entirely its product, called forth by one or another degree of the people’s development. Hence, despite the changing forms of government among the Hebrew people—the rule of the judges and the monarchy—self-governance remained legally in full force and suffered limitation not from the essence of one or another form of government, but from the abuse on the part of its representatives. In the time of Joshua, we find popular self-governance in the full flower of its development. When ambassadors from the Gibeonites came to conclude an alliance with the Israelites by cunning means, it says in Joshua 9:6: “they came to Joshua and said to the men of Israel,” to which “the Israelites said to them.” From this alone it is evident that by “the Israelites” we must understand some separate assembly. But then in Joshua 9:15 it is plainly narrated: “Joshua made peace with them,” and in Joshua 9:18 “the leaders of the congregation had sworn to them.” When the deception was discovered, “the whole congregation murmured against the leaders,” to which “all the leaders said to the whole congregation: we have sworn to them” (Josh. 9:19), and so on. Here the “national assembly” evidently appears in the form as we have described it—with its subdivision into two chambers. We find mention of a similar national assembly in the first books of Kings. “And all the elders of Israel gathered, and came to Samuel at Ramah” with a request to appoint a king (1 Sam. 8:4). This assembly of elders is further called “the people” in 1 Samuel 8:7 and 8:10: “and Samuel told all the words of the LORD to the people who were asking of him a king.” It is clear that here the expression “people” refers to the assembly of elders who represent the people. And that this assembly indeed had political significance is evident from the fact that Samuel, contrary to his own desire, yields to the energetically expressed national will. Accounts of the national assembly are found also in later history. It was convened on the occasion of the elections of kings David, Jeroboam, Joash, Josiah, Jehoahaz, and Uzziah (2 Sam. 5:1; 1 Kings 12:20; 2 Kings 11:19; 21:1; 23:30; 2 Chron. 26:1), and on many other important occasions in the state’s life. In view of all this, the fundamental form of state governance must be considered—despite the changing external forms—to be the form of popular self-governance through elected representatives of the people. Saalschütz, seeking a name for such a form of government, suggests that it is most conveniently called patriarchal-democratic. In the governance of the state, as we saw above, the whole people participated, but not personally—rather through their elected representatives. In such a case, the convenience or inconvenience of the form of government depends on the degree to which what the representatives resolve flows from the sense and will of the people. In this regard, the form of patriarchal democracy, in Saalschütz’s view, offers the greatest conveniences. “The senior member of the household, of the family, stands in the closest relation to those whom he represents in the popular assemblies. Their interests are in substance his own interests, and what he has decided, what he has counseled, has binding force for them. Such was the governance of the Hebrews, which Moses found already in place and only gave it wider development. Thanks to such governance, often a single word of a prophet—for the dissemination of which in that time there were not yet such means as today—penetrated to the remotest corners of the state. What the elders, the representatives of the people, decided and adopted became a sacred duty for the entire people. The law, thanks to the wise provisions of the lawgiver, was widely disseminated among the people, and through the expedient organization of governance any new resolution could quickly be put into practice.” The expediency of such an order of things stands out even more clearly from the fact that the very law was not imposed upon the people as something foreign to them, but was fully adapted to the spirit and history of the people, was “not too difficult and not far away” from the people, but “very near to them, in their mouths and in their hearts” (Deut. 30:11–14).