Preamble

The enormous influence of the life and person of Jesus of Nazareth upon history is acknowledged by all. And His death on the cross, which Christians of all ages have recognized as the most important act of His ministry, became the starting point of a new history. His tomb, in the words of the poet, was the grave of the ancient world and the cradle of the new. But this eternally memorable event was the execution of a criminal sentence that followed upon two judicial proceedings, one conducted under Hebrew law and the other under Roman law.

From a judicial standpoint, the trial of Jesus Christ is an extraordinary and perhaps even unique occurrence. History has preserved many judicial tragedies. Criminal trials of the kind involving Socrates, King Charles of England, and Mary Queen of Scots have always attracted the attention of people with compelling force. But the trial of Christ made a greater impression upon the world than all of them combined. Apart from its world-historical significance, it holds a purely juridical interest that none of the aforementioned trials possesses. By the common conviction of legal scholars, the most important place among all jurisprudences is occupied by the jurisprudence of ancient Rome, and the most distinctive of all, and one highly esteemed by the Christian world, was the jurisprudence of the Jewish state. It is understandable that if these two renowned and decisively different systems encounter one another, then the investigation of such a case from a juridical point of view must present great interest. And if these two systems meet with one another in an event that is supremely striking and fraught with consequences, then the investigation of their joint application becomes exceedingly important. It becomes the most interesting problem that the history of jurisprudence can present.

A multitude of questions at once arise, namely: were there two proceedings here, or one? Was the second proceeding a mere review of the first, or was the first only a preliminary with respect to the second? Were the forms—in one case of Hebrew, in the other of Roman law—observed, and was there any desire to observe them? Was there an attempt, in one case and the other, with or without observance of forms, to achieve justice on the merits of the case? Furthermore, were the same charges brought before the Hebrew and the Roman tribunals? For what offense did the Accused die? Was the verdict in both cases just in form, that is, was it reached by a path conforming to the Hebrew and Roman rules of procedure? Was it just on the merits, that is, in accordance with the then-prevailing Hebrew or Roman laws?

These juridical questions arise of themselves upon a careful reading of the history of the event. We shall examine each of the two proceedings separately in their application to the great event.