Chapter XXI. How Again by an Ambiguous Response He Caused Croesus to Lose His Own Kingdom

[OENOMAUS] ‘IT seems then that thou dost verily know all things that are worth no more than sand, but knowest nothing that is excellent. For example, that “the smell of a strong-shelled tortoise boiling should strike on thy senses,” is a piece of knowledge worth but sand, not being even true in itself, but nevertheless becoming to the braggart and the shameless, who looks supercilious over his empty bits of knowledge and tries to persuade Croesus the Lydian captive not to despise him.

‘For he relying upon the trial (of the oracles), intended soon after to ask thee whether he should make an expedition against the Persians, and to make thee his adviser concerning his insane and grasping policy. And thou didst not shrink from telling him, that

“The Halys crossed, Croesus a mighty empire shall destroy.” [1]

‘That certainly was well contrived, that it mattered nought to thee, if he should suffer some strange disaster from being incited by an ambiguous oracle to attack a foreign empire, nor if certain bitter and malicious persons, instead of duly praising thee for having driven a madman headlong, went so far as to accuse thee of having uttered a phrase which was not even equally balanced, that the Lydian king might hesitate and take counsel; but they said that the word “καταλῦσαι” could be understood by the Greeks only in one way, not to be driven from his own empire, but to acquire the empire of another.

‘For Cyrus, the semi-Mede or semi-Persian, or, as he was called in the riddle, “the mule,” being of a royal race by his mother, but of an ordinary stock on his father’s side, shows incidentally the inflated poetry, but especially the blind divination of the soothsayer, if he did not know that the riddle would be misunderstood.

‘If, however, he was thus playing with him not from ignorance but from insolence and malice, heavens! how strange are the playthings of the gods. And if it was not this, but that the things must of necessity so happen, this is of all deceitful speeches the most wicked. For if it must so happen, why nevertheless dost thou, unhappy god, sit at Delphi chanting empty and useless prophecies? And of what use art thou to us? And why are we so mad, who run to thee from all quarters of the earth? And what right hast thou to the savour of sacrifices?’

This plain speaking of Oenomaus in the Detection of Impostorsis not free from cynical bitterness. For he will not admit that the oracles which are admired among all the Greeks proceed from a daemon, much less from a god, but says that they are frauds and tricks of human impostors, cunningly contrived to deceive the multitude. And since I have once mentioned these matters, there can be no objection to hearing other refutations also; and first, that in which the same author says that he had been himself deceived by the Clarian Apollo: he writes as follows: [2]