Chapter XXVII. The Hebrews and Plato on the Immortality of the Soul
IN the doctrine of the immortality of the soul Plato differs not at all in opinion from Moses. For Moses was the first to define the soul in man as being an immortal essence, when he said that it is originally an image of God, or rather has been made ‘after the image of God.’ For his words were, ‘God said, Let us make man after our image, and after our likeness. . . . And God made man, in the image of God made He him.’ [1]
And afterwards dividing the compound man in his description into the visible body and the man of the soul that is discerned only by the mind, he adds, ‘And God took dust from the earth and formed man, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.’ [2]
Moreover he says that man was made fit to be ruler and king of all the creatures upon earth. So he says,[3] ‘And God said, Let us make man after our image, and after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and over the fowls of the heaven, and over the cattle, and over all the earth. . . . And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him.’
Now in what other way could an image and likeness of God be conceived than in reference to the powers that are in God, and to the likeness of virtue? Hear then how in the AlcibiadesPlato speaks on this point also as one who had been taught by Moses:
[PLATO] [4] ‘Can we then mention any part of the soul that is more divine than that with which knowledge and wisdom have to do?
‘We cannot.
‘This then is the part of it like God; and any one who by looking upon this has learned all that is divine, both God and wisdom, will thus get to know himself also most perfectly.
‘It is evident.
[‘So then, just as there are mirrors clearer than the mirror in the eye, and purer and brighter, so God is something purer and brighter than the best that is in our soul.
‘It seems so, Socrates.
‘In looking then on God, we should be using that noblest mirror of man’s nature also for looking into the virtue of the soul; and in this way should best see and learn to know ourselves. Certainly.’] [5]
This is in the Alcibiades.But in the dialogue On the Soulobserve how he explains these topics more at length. [6]
‘May we then, said he, assume two kinds of existing things, one visible and the other invisible?
‘Let us assume it, said he.
‘And the invisible constant and immutable, but the visible never constant?
‘This also let us assume.
‘Well then, said he, is not the one part of ourselves body, and the other soul?
‘Exactly so, said he.
‘To which class then should we say that the body is more like and more akin?
‘Oh, that is manifest to every one, said he; to the visible.
‘And what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?
‘Not visible at any rate by men, Socrates.
‘But we surely were speaking of the things that are visible or not visible to the nature of man; or was it, think you, to some other nature?
‘To man’s nature.
‘What do we say then about the soul? Is it visible or invisible?
‘Invisible.
‘Then it is unseen?
‘Yes.
‘Soul then is more like the unseen than body is, and body like the visible?
‘It must certainly be so, Socrates.
‘Well then, were we not also saying long ago, that whenever the soul uses the help of the body to examine anything, either by sight, or by hearing, or by any other sense (for this is what is meant by “the help of the body,” to examine a thing by the help of sense), that then she is dragged by the body into the midst of these ever-changing objects, and loses her own way, and becomes confused, and giddy as if drunken, from trying to lay hold of things of this same kind?
‘Quite so.
‘But whenever she is contemplating anything by herself alone, she passes at once into yonder world, to the pure, and eternal, and immortal, and unchangeable, and there and with that world she ever communes as one of kindred nature, whenever she can be alone, and have opportunity; and so she has rest from her wandering, and with that world she is constant and unchangeable, as trying to lay hold of things of this same kind. And this condition of the soul is called thoughtfulness.
‘Very nobly and truly spoken, Socrates, said he.
‘To which class then does it now seem to you, from both our former and our present arguments, that the soul is more like and more akin?
‘Every one, I think, Socrates, said he, even the most stupid, would from this method of inquiry agree that soul is in every way much more like to that which is ever constant than to that which is not.
‘And what of the body?
‘More like the other.
‘Look at it then again in this way; that, when soul and body are combined in one, nature orders the body to serve and to obey, and the soul to rule and to govern. Now in these respects again which of the two seems to you to be like the divine, and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the divine is naturally fitted to rule and to lead, and the mortal to be ruled and to serve?
‘I think so.
‘To which of the two then is the soul like?
‘Evidently, Socrates, the soul is like the divine, and the body like the mortal.
‘Consider then, Cebes, said he, whether from all that has been said we obtain these results: that soul is most like the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and ever unchangeable and self-consistent; and the body on the other hand most like the human, and mortal, and unintelligible, arid multiform, and dissoluble, and never consistent with itself.
‘Have we anything else to say against this, my dear Cebes, to show that it is not so?
‘We have not.
‘Well then? This being so, is it not a property of body to be quickly dissolved, but of soul on the other hand to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so?
‘Certainly.
‘Do you then observe, that after a man is dead, the body, the part of him which is visible and lies in the visible world, and is called a corpse, the property of which is to be dissolved, and decomposed, and scattered by the winds, does not at once suffer any change of this kind, but remains for a considerable time----if the man die with his body in a vigorous state and at a vigorous time of life, for a very considerable time indeed. For when the body has shrunk and been embalmed, like those who were embalmed in Egypt, it remains almost entire an incredible time. And even if the body be decayed, some parts of it, bones and sinews and all such parts, are nevertheless, so to say, immortal, are they not?
‘Yes.
‘But then the soul, the unseen, that has passed to another place like herself, noble, and pure, and unseen, the true Hades, to the presence of the good and wise God, whither, if it be God’s will, my own soul is presently to go----is then, I say, this soul of ours, such as she is and so endowed by nature, on being released from the body, immediately scattered to the winds and lost, as most men say?
‘Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias; but the truth is much rather this. If the soul is pure when released, drawing nothing of the body after her, as she never during this life had any communication with it willingly, but shrank from it, and was gathered up into herself, as making this her constant study, and this is nothing else than practising true philosophy, and preparing in reality to die cheerfully,----Or would not this be a preparation for death?
‘Certainly.
‘In this condition then the soul departs to that world which is like herself, the unseen, the divine, and deathless, and wise: and on arriving there she finds ready for her a happy existence, released from error, and folly, and fears, and wild desires, and all other human ills, and, as they say of the initiated, she truly passes the rest of her time with the gods. Is it thus, Cebes, that we ought to speak, or otherwise?
‘Thus assuredly, said Cebes.
‘But, I suppose, if when she departs from the body she is polluted and impure, from being in constant communion with the body, and cherishing it, and loving it, and having been so bewitched by it, I mean by its desires and pleasures, as to think that nothing else is true except the corporeal, just what a man might touch, and see, and eat, and drink, and use for his lusts----but accustomed to hate and fear and shun what to the eyes is dark and invisible, but intelligible to thought and attainable by philosophy----in this condition then do you suppose that a soui will depart pure in herself and unalloyed?
‘By no means, said he.’
This is what Plato says. And his meaning is explained by Porphyry in the first Book of his Answer to Boethus Concerning the Soul,where he writes in the following manner: