Chapter III. Extract From Diogenianus, That Their Soothsaying is Inconsistent and Full of Falsehood, and Their Prediction Useless and Mischievous

[DIOGENIANUS] ‘But Chrysippus, in the book before mentioned, brings also another proof of the following kind. He says that the predictions of the prophets could not be true unless all things were fast bound by fate: which is itself a most silly argument. For he argues as if it were evident or would be more readily admitted by any one, that all the predictions of the so-called prophets came to pass, than that all things take place according to fate, as if the former would not itself be an equally false statement, since plain experience shows the contrary; I mean that not all the things foretold, or rather not the greatest part of them, come to pass.

‘Thus Chrysippus has brought us his proof, by establishing each proposition from the other. For he wishes to show that all things take place according to fate from the existence of prophecy: but the existence of prophecy he could not prove in any other way, if he did not first assume that all things occur according to fate.

‘But what method of proof could be more wretched than this? For that some things come to pass according to the plain meaning of what the prophets foretell would be a sign, not of the existence of prophetic science, but of the accidental concurrence of the events in agreement with the predictions----a thing which gives us no indication of any science.

‘For neither should we call an archer scientific who hit the mark once now and then, but missed many times; nor a physician who killed the greater number of those who were attended by him, but was able to save one sometimes; nor do we ever give the name of science to that which does not succeed in all, or at least in the greatest part of its proper operations.

‘Now that most of the predictions of the so-called prophets fail, the whole experience of human life would bear witness; and so would these men themselves who profess the art of prophecy, because it is not by this that they help themselves in the exigencies of life, but use sometimes their own judgement, and sometimes the counsel and cooperation of those who have been thought to possess experience in each kind of affairs.

‘But with regard to the want of consistency in this which we have chosen to call prophecy, we will render fuller proof elsewhere, bringing forward the opinions of Epicurus on this point also. But at present we will add to what has been said only this much, that at most the fact of the so-called prophets speaking truth sometimes in their predictions must be an effect, not of science, but of an accidental cause; for it is not that a man never hits the proposed mark, but that he does not hit it always, nor even in most cases, and not from science even when he does occasionally succeed, this is what we have chosen to call a work of chance----we who have arranged our own ideas in clear order under each term. Further, if even by hypothesis it were true that the prophetic art is able to discern and to foretell all things future, it might be concluded that all things are according to fate, but the usefulness of the art and its benefit to life could never be shown; and it is for this purpose especially that Chrysippus seems to sing the praises of the prophetic art.

‘For what benefit would it be to us to learn beforehand the misfortunes certain to come to pass, which it would not even be possible to guard against? For how could any one guard against the things which take place according to fate? So that there is no benefit to us in the prophetic art, but rather it would tend to some mischief, by causing mankind to grieve in vain beforehand over the predicted misfortunes which must of necessity come to pass.

‘For no one will affirm that the prediction of future blessings affords on the other hand equal delight: since man is not naturally so disposed to rejoice over expected blessings, as to be grieved over misfortunes. Especially as we hope that the latter will not happen at all to ourselves, until we hear it: but all of us, so to say, rather look for blessings, because our nature is congenial thereto; for most persons have formed hopes of things even greater than what can possibly come to pass.

‘Hence it results that the prediction of blessings either does not at all increase the joy, because even apart from the prediction every one of his own accord expects the better fortune, or else increases it but little by the supposed certainty, and often even diminishes the joy, when less is foretold than what was hoped for; but the prediction of evils causes great perturbation, both because of their repulsive nature, and because the prediction is sometimes opposed to men’s hopes.

‘But even if this did not happen, nevertheless it would be evident, I think, to every one that the prediction would be useless. For if any one shall affirm that the usefulness of the prophetic art will be maintained on account of the prediction of the misfortune which will certainly happen unless we should guard against it, he can no longer show that all things are to happen in accordance with fate, if it is in our power either to guard or not to guard against them.

‘For if any one shall say that this choice also is controlled by necessity, so as to extend fate to all things that exist, the usefulness of prophecy on the other hand is destroyed; for we shall keep guard if it is so fated, and evidently we shall not keep guard if it is not fated that we shall keep guard, even though all the prophets foretell to us what is about to happen.

‘As to Oedipus, for instance, and Alexander son of Priam, even Chrysippus himself says that though their parents had recourse to many contrivances to kill them, in order that they might guard against the mischief predicted from them, they were unable to do so.

‘Thus there was no benefit, he says, even to them from the prediction of the evils, because they were effects proceeding from fate. Let this then be enough, and more than enough, to have been said in regard to not merely the uncertainty but also the uselessness of the prophetic art.’

Thus far the philosopher. Do thou however consider with thyself, how those who were Greeks, and had from an early age acquired the customary education of the Greeks, and knew more accurately than any men the customs of their ancestors concerning the gods, all Aristotelians, and Cynics, and Epicureans, and all who held like opinions with them, poured ridicule upon the oracles which were renowned among the Greeks themselves.

And yet, if the stories current concerning the miraculous power of the oracles were true, it was natural that these men also should have been struck with wonder, being Greeks, and having an accurate understanding of the customs of their ancestors, and regarding nothing worthy to be known as of secondary importance.

To collect, however, these and all similar evidences, in order to overthrow the argument on behalf of the oracles, there would be abundant means: but it is not in this way that I wish to pursue the present discussion, but in the same way as we started at first, by granting that those who stand forth in their defence speak truth; in order that from their own avowals, when they affirm that oracles are true, and that the alleged responses are divinely inspired Pythian oracles, we may learn the exact explanation of the things alleged.