§ 224. The Sphere of Ecclesiastical Power and of State Power

Having established the principle of the mutual bond between ecclesiastical and state power, and having shown the necessity of that bond for the common good, let us now see what, according to positive law, are the boundaries within which each power may move in its own legislation, and what matters fall within the competence of the one or the other power, and what matters again fall within the joint competence of both.

Of this one can speak, in ecclesiastical law, only with regard to those states which recognize the lawful existence of the Christian Church and which hold it as their rule that the fundamental truths professed by the Church must in no way be infringed. For ecclesiastical law it is a matter of indifference what political constitution prevails in this or that state; it takes state power in a general sense, nor does it look to whether the bearer of that state power belongs to one or another of the confessions that exist today. What matters for the law is that the Church be lawfully recognized in the state, and once that fact exists, then, in the main, the same norms apply, for all such states, with regard to the relation between state and ecclesiastical power. These norms must apply in all such states, because, if a state is imbued with the consciousness that in Christianity lies the guarantee of the common good of society and of the good of the state, then it will never wish, and morally will not even be able, to command its subjects to do anything that would conflict with Christian truths and that might provoke a conflict between the laws of the state and the laws of the Church. When these norms are observed, the relation between Church and State can only ever be a right relation. The Church is independent, and the state too is independent, and each has its own defined sphere within which, according to its own end, it carries on its activity; and since the bond between them is necessary for the common good, each will develop its activity independently within its own sphere, holding strictly to its own boundaries, but at the same time penetrated by mutual interest—the Church by the interests of the state, and the state by the interests of the Church—while in matters of common concern, where the interests of both come into direct contact, they will develop their activity jointly, establishing by law only that which will be capable of guaranteeing the constancy of their bond and the common good and peace.

The particular sphere of activity of Church and State is determined by the very nature of the matters themselves and by their end: in spiritual matters, which have a spiritual end and concern the salvation of souls, the ecclesiastical power is competent to issue the relevant legal prescriptions; in matters which have an earthly end and concern the maintenance of peace and order in society, even if they are not always of a material nature, the state power is competent; while both powers are jointly competent in matters which concern, at one and the same time, both the spiritual life of the Church and the earthly life of the state.

The exhaustive enumeration of these matters, according to the competence of the respective power, constitutes the task of the codification of the law; here we shall present them only according to their general bases.

1. The Church is independently competent to adjudicate all matters of a spiritual nature, namely: a) faith and Christian morals; b) ecclesiastical worship; c) the sacraments in their ecclesiastical significance; d) the internal ecclesiastical administration; e) the reception of unbelievers or persons of other faiths into the Church; f) admission to the clergy; g) admission of monks into the monastery and oversight of monastic life; h) administration of church property; i) the ecclesiastical court; j) legislation in everything that concerns the internal life of the Church.

2. The state is independently competent to adjudicate: a) the civil and political status of subjects, whether of the lay or the clerical order; b) matters of private law; c) matters where the violation of state laws is concerned; d) the civil and political significance of the official documents of ecclesiastical authority; e) the significance which acts performed by the Church, and the sacraments in particular, may have for the state.

3. Both ecclesiastical and state power are jointly competent in all matters which directly concern both the Church and the state; that is: the determination of the boundaries of ecclesiastical territories, the establishment of dioceses, parishes, and the like; the establishment of holidays, with the obligation of citizens not to work on those days; the erection of church buildings, cemeteries, institutes, and the like, and whether they conform to the general sanitary and building regulations; the establishment of monasteries, and whether they conform to those same regulations; church schools, insofar as the certificates of those schools are to be recognized by the state; appointment to episcopal, parochial, and similar posts; the keeping of parish registers, and so forth.

Of such mixed matters, in which both ecclesiastical and state power are competent, there are a great many, and it would be extraordinarily difficult to enumerate them all. As regards the exercise of that competence, one usually takes into account the ecclesiastical and civil consequences of the act itself, so that, if they can be separated, each power issues its ordinances according to its own competence; but if those consequences are inseparable, then attention is paid to which of the two, Church or state, the matter primarily belongs, and accordingly the one decides on it as the first authority, while the other adjusts its own prescriptions with regard to the decision of the first. According to the many points of contact between Church and state, where mutuality exists between them, there arise many church matters in which the state power is competent to a greater or lesser degree; and likewise there are many political and civil matters in which the Church too is called to exercise her right.

According to that great influence which Christian rulers allowed to the Church and her representatives in political and civil matters, it was entirely natural that the Church too should have had to allow the state power the widest influence in ecclesiastical affairs.[1] The history of ecclesiastical law shows us that the Church recognized in the state power the right to issue laws not only with regard to external matters that concerned the Church, but also with regard to matters that concerned the internal life of the Church. The Council of Carthage presents us, in its 93rd canon, with an example of this: “Their imperial love of mankind ought to take care that the Catholic Church, which conceived them in her pious womb and raised them by the strength of the faith, be protected by their care; that in their pious times no bold men be permitted to overwhelm the powerless people with threats, who could not be brought to evil by persuasion… We therefore now beseech that, as soon as possible, protection be extended to the Catholic clergy, and that not only in all the cities, but also in all the places of the individual neighboring estates.” This example from the Council of Carthage we find repeated several times in other canons as well, and in particular at the Council of Chalcedon,[2] whereby the confirmation of the ecumenical Church was set upon such a relation toward the state power and its right, even in matters of faith. And to this request from the Church side the Christian emperors responded with full readiness, and history has preserved for us a great many imperial ordinances concerning the faith and its safeguarding from error. This same thing we find that the Christian emperors did also with regard to ecclesiastical worship—for example, when they issue ordinances concerning churches and their arrangement, concerning feast days, concerning church officials, and so forth.[3] In all these legal ordinances of theirs, moreover, the Christian emperors held themselves within the bounds which the ecclesiastical laws had established, nor did they ever, on their own authority, interfere with matters of the internal life of the Church, but issued their laws only at the invitation of the Church, that the faith and ecclesiastical worship might be preserved intact and just as the Church had established them by her own independent legislative power.

This same right of legislative power the Church has recognized, and recognizes, in the state also with regard to matters of the external life of the Church. Among other things, the Church recognizes in the state the right to exercise supreme oversight as to whether ecclesiastical administration is carried out according to legal prescriptions, to confirm the respective ministers of the Church in their offices, that no ecclesiastical institutions be established without the state power, that the ordinances of the ecclesiastical power be protected and defended by worldly force, and so on.[4] In all these and similar matters the Church has recognized wide rights in the state, and could recognize them without any fear, because that state power itself understood the high significance, the beneficent significance, of the Church in civil society, and was strictly penetrated by the ecclesiastical spirit. In a state where it is established by state law as a norm that “the canons shall have the same force as the laws of the state,” and that “what the canons forbid, that the laws of the state forbid also,” in such a state the Church can recognize in the state power even wider rights, without fearing in the least that her freedom and independence will suffer any harm from this.