Chapter VIII. On the Same Subject. From Diogenianus

[DIOGENIANUS] [1] ‘In addition to all this it is worth while to quote also the opinions of Chrysippus the Stoic on this subject. For in his first book Of Fate wishing to show that all things are comprehended under necessity and fate, he employs among certain other testimonies the following expressions in the poet Homer:

“For me the hateful doom of death, E’en from my birth assigned, too soon hath yawn’d,” [2]

‘and:

“Though the time shall come For him to suffer all such things as fate Decreed, when first his thread of life was spun;” [3]

‘and again :

“His fate I say no mortal e’er hath shunned.” [4]

‘But he does not observe that the expressions elsewhere used by the Poet are directly opposed to these, I mean those which Chrysippus himself employs in his Second Book, when he wishes to prove that there are also many things caused by us, as for example:

“They by their own presumptuous folly died”, [5]

and this:

“Perverse mankind, whose wills, created free, Charge all their woes on absolute decree; All to the dooming gods their guilt translate, And follies are miscalled the crimes of fate.” [6]

‘For these expressions and such as these are opposed to the idea that all things take place according to fate. Nor indeed was he able to perceive even this, that Homer by no means bears witness to his dogma even in those former verses. For it will be found from them that he suggests not that all things are brought to pass according to fate, but rather that certain things occur according thereto.

‘For the passage----

“For me the hateful doom of death, E’en from my birth assigned, too soon hath yawned “----

‘could not mean that all things occur according to fate, but only just that he was soon to die: for most truly it is fated that every being born into life must die.

‘Moreover the passage----

“Though the time shall come For him to suffer all such things as fate Decreed, when first his thread of life was spun “----

‘has the same meaning. For it does not say that all things which are to befall him hereafter will occur according to fate, but that certajn things will occur to him according to necessity. For what else than this is signified by the distinction “such things as”? And many things, though not all, are laid upon us according to necessity.

‘Again, the verse----

“His fate I say no mortal e’er hath shunned”----

‘is a very good statement. For who could possibly escape things that of necessity occur to every living being? So that Chrysippus, far from having Homer voting with him in the opinion that all things take place according to fate, would have him as an opponent; since the latter has often and plainly stated that many things occur through our causation, but can nowhere be found to say expressly that all things occur according to necessity.

‘And inasmuch as a poet does not promise us the true nature of real things, but imitates all kinds of human passions, and dispositions, and opinions, it would be suitable for him often to make contrary statements: but it would not befit a philosopher to make contrary statements, nor to use the testimony of a poet for this purpose.’

After other matters, he says, also:

‘But Chrysippus thinks that he brings another strong proof of the presence of fate in all things, in the adoption of names of this kind. For he says that destiny (πεπρωμενην) is a certain arrangement determined (πεπερασμενην) and concluded, and that fate (ειμαρμενην) is a kind of bond woven (ειρομενην) either out of the will of Zeus, or of any other cause.

‘ Moreover the goddesses of fate (Μοιρας) have been so called from some one of them having been assigned (μεμερισθαι) and allotted to each of us. In the same way he says that the word το χρεων (“the debt”) is used, meaning the portion that falls to our share and is due to us according to fate. And the number of the Fates suggests the three periods in which all things revolve, and by which they are fulfilled.

‘Lachesis is so called from casting lots (λαγχανειν) for each man’s destiny: Atropos from the unchanging (ατρεπτον) and unalterable character of the distribution; and Clotho from all things being twisted together (συγκλεκωσθαι) and woven, and from their having only one appointed solution. For by this and the like silly talk he thinks that he proves the necessity present in all things.

‘But it occurs to me to wonder if in speaking thus he was not conscious of his own nonsensical talk. For let it be granted that men entertained these notions when they imposed the names that have been set forth, according to his own etymologies, and supposed that fate had bound all things fast, and that the causes which had been from eternity predetermined were immutable in all real existences and all passing events.

‘What then, Chrysippus? do you follow all the opinions of mankind, and does not one of them appear to you to be mistaken on any point, and are all men capable of seeing the truth?

‘How then say you that there is no man who does not seem to you as mad as Orestes and Alcmaeon, except the wise? And there have been, say you, only one or two wise, and the rest for their folly have been equally mad with those whom I have named?

‘And how do you refute the errors of those opinions of theirs about riches, for example, and fame, and sovereignty, and pleasure in general, things which most men have thought good? How say you, too, that the established laws and the constitutions of states have all been wrong? Or why did you write such a multitude of books, if on no point mankind held mistaken opinions?

‘For we must not say that, when they hold the same opinions with you, they judge rightly, but when they differ, are mad.

‘For in the first place even you do not call yourself wise, much less do we, that we should make their concurrence with your opinion a criterion of their good judgement at any time; and further, even if this were true, why should you say that they are all equally mad, instead of commending them, in as far as they appeared to be of the same opinions with you, for having got hold of a right opinion, and considering them to be wrong, in as far as they dissented from you?

‘Not even thus, however, was it natural to suppose that their opinion is an adequate evidence of the truth; and every one would acknowledge, not that he is mad, as you think, but that he is far removed from wisdom.

‘It will be ridiculous therefore for you to use these men, whom vou would declare to be no better than yourself in understanding, as bearing witness by their imposition of the names, unless indeed it has happened that those who originally gave these names were wise men----a thing which you cannot possibly prove.

‘However, let it be granted to you that this is so, and that those names are given with their significations as you wish, and that this circumstance has not been a result of false opinions: where then do they indicate that all things without exception are in accordance with fate, and not rather these only, if any, with which fate is concerned.

‘For the number of the Fates, and their names, and Clotho’s spindle, and the thread wound upon it, and the ball of this thread, and all other such things mentioned in that story, indicate the immutability and eternal fitness of the causes in all things which are bound by necessity to take place thus, and all which are hindered from being otherwise.

‘And there would be many things of this nature; but others are not so; and to some of these latter men ascribed gods as rulers and creators, and of some they supposed us to be ourselves the causes, and of others again nature, and of others fortune: and of this last they wished to indicate the changefulness and instability, and its turning now this way and now that; and to show this kind of casualty in affairs by an image, they represented Fortune as standing on a globe.

‘Or are not even these opinions held among mankind? For if at times men confuse the causes, and think that those things which are the results of fate or fortune proceed from a divine power, and that the things of which we are the cause depend on fate, yet surely it is manifest to every one that they think there are all these causes in things.

‘So the result is that neither the notions adopted by mankind, nor the imposition of such names as have been mentioned, bear testimony to the opinion of Chrysippus.’

To this he next adds:

‘Such are some of the proofs that he has used in his first book Concerning Fate, but in the second he tries to solve the absurdities that seem to follow from the statement that all things are subjected to necessity, the same absurdities which we set forth at the beginning: for example, that it destroys the earnest desire on our own part in regard to censure, and praise, and exhortation, and all things which appear to be consequent upon our own causation.

‘In the second book then he says it is evident that many things do originate with us, but nevertheless even these are connected by fate with the general arrangement of the whole.

‘And he has employed certain examples of the following kind. That a man’s cloak should not be lost, was fated, he says, not absolutely but with the condition of its being carefully kept: and that this or that man should be saved from the hands of the enemy, with the condition of his fleeing from the enemy: and the birth of children, with the willingness to cohabit with a wife.

‘For just as it would be absurd, says he, if, upon some one’s saying that Hegesarchus the boxer would come off from the fight without a single scratch, a man were to recommend Hegesarchus to fight with his hands down, because it was fated that he was to come off untouched, whereas he who made the assertion said so because of the man’s superabundant caution against being hit; so it is also in all other cases.

‘For many things cannot take place without the addition of our willing them, and bringing into play the most intense earnestness and zeal concerning them, because it was fated, he says, that they were to take place with this condition.

‘Here then again one may wonder at the man’s want of discernment and consideration, both of the sensible evidences and of the inconsequence of his own arguments. For I imagine that just as what we call sweet is the direct opposite of what is called bitter, and black of white, and hot of cold, so what depends on us is the direct opposite of what depends on fate; if at least it is assumed that one calls the effects of fate whatever things take place absolutely whether we will or no, and effects of our action whatever things come to their fulfilment from our diligence and energy, or fail of fulfilment in consequence of our carelessness and indolence.

‘If therefore my diligence in guarding the cloak be the cause of its being saved, and a man’s will to consort with his wife the cause of the children being born, and the will to flee from his enemies the cause of his escape from being killed by them, and the fighting bravely against his antagonist and guarding against the blows from his hands the cause of his coming off from the contest without a scratch, how is the dependence on fate to be maintained here? For if these results follow from fate, they cannot be said to follow from our will: but if from us, then evidently not from fate, because these cannot concur one with the other.

‘But, says he, they will follow from our will, that will however having been included in fate. But how included (I should say), if at least both the guarding the cloak and the not guarding it proceeded from my free will? For thus it is evident that its preservation also would be in my power.

‘Also from the very distinction which Chrysippus makes, it becomes evident that our causation is freed from fate. For, says he, it is fated that the cloak be preserved, if thou guard it: and that there will be children, if also thou shouldst will it; but otherwise none of these things would have to take place. But in the case of things predetermined by fate we should never employ these pretended conditions.

‘So we do not say that every man will die, if so and so should happen, and that he will not die if it should not happen, but simply that he will die, whatsoever may be done to prevent his dying at all; nor do we say that a certain man will be incapable of feeling pain, even if he do this or that; but that every man is capable of feeling pain, whether he wish it or not: and so of all other things which are fated to be in this way and no other.

‘So that if it is necessary that this or that should take place, if we should wish it, but otherwise not, it is manifest that our wishing or not wishing was not previously constrained by any other cause, but was in our own power.

‘And if this was not subject to necessity, it is evident also that the occurrence of this or that was not eternally predetermined, unless even the very wish to guard the cloak, or the unwillingness, was a consequence of some fate and the effect of some external necessary cause.

‘But in this latter case the power of our free will is utterly destroyed, and the cause of the cloak being saved or being lost would no longer be in me; wherefore also I should reasonably be free from blame if it were lost (for its loss was due to some other cause), and on the other hand I should deserve no praise if it were saved, because even this was not my doing. But you were as positive with your argument as if you could make all sure.’

So far the writer before mentioned. But to this let us subjoin also our extracts from the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias, a man very illustrious in philosophical studies, who also himself in his book On Fate used such statements as follow to overthrow the dogma.