Chapter IX. On the Same Subject. From Alexander Aphrodisiensis

[ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS] [1] ‘The causes of events are divided into four kinds, as the divine Aristotle has shown: for of causes some are efficient, and some material; there is also among them the formal cause; and besides these three there is the final cause, for the sake of which the thing is done.

‘So many are the different kinds of causes: for whatever is a cause of anything will be found to be included under one of these classes. For although all events do not require so many causes, yet those which require the most do not exceed the said number.

‘But the difference between them will be more easy to recognize, if it be seen in some example of what occurs. Let us then show the distinction of causes in the case of a statue. Now as the “efficient cause” of the statue there is the artist who made it, whom we call the sculptor: and as “matter,” the bronze substance, or stone, or whatever that may be which is shaped by the artist according to his art: for this also is a cause of the production and existence of the statue.

‘Again, the form also, which is produced in this substance by the artist, is itself a cause of the statue: wherefore the form is either a man throwing a quoit, or a javelin, or it is of some other definite shape.

‘These, however, are not the only causes of the production of the statue, but the end for the sake of which it has been made----that is either the honour of some person, or piety towards a god----is inferior to none of the causes of its production. For without a cause the statue would not have been made at all.

‘Since therefore the causes are so many, and their mutual differences easily recognized, we might justly reckon fate among the efficient causes, as bearing a relation to its own effects analogous to the art which creates the statue.

‘This being so, it would follow that we should direct our argument to efficient causes: for thus it will be known whether we ought to regard fate as the cause of all things that are done, or to make room also for some other things besides this as being efficient causes of certain things.

‘Now Aristotle, in making his classification of all things that are done, says that some of them are done for the sake of something, the doer of them having before him a certain aim and end of what is done; and others for the sake of nothing, namely all such as are not done in consequence of any purpose of the doer, nor have reference to any definite end, being such as, for instance, either holding fast a straw or twisting it about, and either stroking or pulling one’s hair, and all actions of this kind.

‘For that these things are done is well known; but they are without the final cause which is the purpose to be gained. Of things therefore which are done in this way, without aim or object, there can be no reasonable classification.

‘But of those things which have reference to something, and are done for the sake of something, some take place according to nature, others according to reason. For those which have nature as the cause of their production advance according to certain numbers and definite order to some end, on reaching which they cease to be produced----unless any obstacle hinder them in their natural course to this appointed end.

‘Also those things which are done according to reason have some end; for nothing done according to reason is done at random, but they all have reference to some end.

‘Now things which are done according to reason are all such as are produced by the doers reasoning about them, and contriving in what way they may be done. In this way are produced all things which are done according to the rules of art, and those which result from a deliberate purpose.

‘And these differ from the products of nature, because these latter have both their origin and the causes of the special character with which they are produced in themselves (for their nature is of this special character); and because they are produced in a certain order, although the nature which is their efficient cause does not employ any reasoning about them, in the same way as do the arts.

‘But the results of art and of deliberate purpose have the origin of their movement and their efficient cause from without, and not in themselves, and the maker’s calculation concerning them guides their production.

‘A third class among things done for some end, namely those that are believed to result from chance or spontaneous action, and which differ from those that are primarily done with some purpose in this way, that in the latter case the means which precede the end are employed for the sake of the end, while in the former cases the actions preceding the end are done for some other end, but while so done for another purpose there occurs to them as an end that which is said to be spontaneous and accidental.

‘Now these things being so, and all things that are done having been distributed into these four kinds, it follows upon this that we should see among which of the efficient causes we must set fate.

‘Is it among those things which are done for no purpose? Or is this altogether unreasonable? For we always use the name fate in regard to some end, and say that this has been brought about in accordance with fate. Wherefore we must necessarily set fate among the things which have a final cause.’

After making these distinctions word for word, the aforesaid author next establishes them more at length, and shows that fate is nothing else than the consequences of natural law; because in actions performed according to our reasoning and according to art the necessity of fate is not discerned.

But he affirms that many natural consequences are hindered from occurring, and that these cases are called contrary to nature, just as in the operations of art there are many things said to be contrary to art. If then any things at all are done contrary to natural law, they must also be done contrary to fate, since the decrees of fate are nothing else than the laws of nature.

[ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS] [2] ‘We see, for instance,’ he says, ‘that the body, from being thus or thus constituted by nature, is liable to diseases and death according to its natural constitution: not, however, in all cases alike, nor of necessity. For oftentimes careful treatment, and changes in the mode of life, and the directions of physicians, and the counsels of the gods avail to drive off a condition of this kind.

‘In the same way in the case of the soul also one might find, contrary to the natural condition, preferences and practices and modes of life different in each of those who were improving from discipline and studies, and better counsels. . . .

‘For example, when the physiognomist once said some absurd things about Socrates the philosopher, very far removed from his chosen course of life, and was being derided for it by the companions of Socrates, Socrates said that Zopyrus had made no mistake: for he would have been of such a character, as far as it depended on his nature, had he not become better than his nature through the discipline of philosophy.’

Such are the effects of nature, which, he says, differ not at all from those of fate. [3]

‘But the results of chance are of the following kind, when a thing has been done for one purpose, and there occurs not that for which it was done, but something else which was not even expected at first. For when a man, in digging for another purpose, and not to find treasure, has lighted upon a treasure, he has found it, he says, by chance. Also when a man has gone into the market for some other purpose, and falls in with his b debtor with money in his hand, and receives what is due to him, men say he has recovered his money by chance. Also when the horse, in hope of food or for some other purpose, has escaped from those who were holding him, but is met in his flight and course by falling into the hands of his masters, he is said by some to have been saved accidentally. Under such conditions these cannot be the results of fate.

‘There are also some causes undiscoverable by human reason, which are believed to occur in consequence of certain antipathies, the real cause of their occurrence being unknown. Such are the effects which certain amulets have been presumed to produce, though they have no reasonable and probable cause to produce these effects: incantations also, and certain conjurings of this kind. For the cause of these things is acknowledged by all men to be obscure: for which reason they call them αναιτιολογετα, things of which the cause cannot be explained.

‘And there are besides these many things which occur contingently, and whichever way it happens, and neither can these be according to fate.

‘By contingent events are meant those wherein it was possible that they might not happen, as is also made clear by the very expression, “whichever way it happens”: [4] as for example, the moving of one’s own limbs, and the casual turning of the neck, and stretching out a finger, and lifting the eyebrows, or that one who is sitting should stand up, and one who is moving should become still, and one who is talking become silent; and in thousands of cases one would find that there existed a power capable of the opposite effects, and these cases cannot depend on fate: for the things which depend on fate do not admit the opposite of their actual condition.

‘Moreover, a man’s power of deliberation is not given to him without purpose: yet he would have this power of deliberation to no purpose, if he performed his actions from necessity. But it evidently appears that man alone has from nature this advantage over the other animals, that he does not follow the impressions of sense as they do, but has in his reason a judge of the circumstances which befall him: and by using this, if the things presented by sense are, on examination, such as they at first appeared, he assents to the impression, and so will pursue them: but if they appear to be different, he no longer abides by his previous conception, after reason has proved the representations false, in consequence of his deliberating upon them.[5]

‘At any rate we deliberate only about things which we have power to do: and whenever we act without having deliberated, we often repent and blame ourselves for our want of consideration: and further, if we see others acting inconsiderately, we charge them with doing wrong, and bid them consult such and such advisers, as knowing that such actions are in our own power.[6]

‘That their argument about fate is false, is sufficiently testified by the fact that even its champions themselves are not able to conform to their own statements. For they profess to exhort and to teach, and they advise men to learn and to be educated, and they reprove and punish those who do things that are not right, as sinning of their own will.[7] Moreover, they leave behind them very many books, by which they expect the young to be educated. They would have ceased, therefore, from being so eager in their arguments if they had observed that (in their books) they claim forgiveness for involuntary offenders, but say that voluntary transgressors deserve punishment, implying evidently that to offend or not lies in their own power.[8]

‘Thus even according to their own account the necessity arising from fate is abolished, and it is established that free-will is ours by nature, with the limitation that there are also very many things not in our own power, as the effects of natural laws, and the accidents of fortune, though even these are contrary to the doctrine of fate, as we have previously shown.’

These statements we have abridged out of a great many, because in the opinions expressed on our side the argument in favour of free-will is of great length: and with this doctrine the utterances of the philosophers which we have quoted concurred, confirming by their testimony our sacred Scriptures, and convicting of falsehood the opinions concerning fate not only of the multitude of mankind but also of the wonderful oracular gods. And some of these extracts were sarcastically aimed against the famous answers of oracles, and some were objections urged against the wonderful philosophers by their own associates. Now therefore it is time to examine also the arguments of the astrologers against the Chaldean sect, of those, I mean, who profess this mischievous charlatanism as a learned study. And my proofs on this subject I shall present to you from one who is by birth a Syrian, and has pursued his inquiries to the highest point of Chaldean science. The man’s name is Bardesanes, and in his Dialogues with his companions it is recorded that he spake as follows: